The Growth Effects of Institutional Instability by Berggren, Niclas et al.
 
 
The growth effects of institutional instability 
 
Niclas Berggren ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ Andreas Bergh ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ Christian Bjørnskov
¤ 
 
Abstract     Both institutional quality and institutional stability have been argued to stimulate 
economic growth. But to improve institutional quality, a country must endure a period of 
institutional change, which implies at least a little and possibly a lot of institutional instability. We 
investigate the growth effects of institutional quality and instability, using the political risk index 
from the ICRG in a cross country study of 132 countries, measuring instability as the coefficient of 
variation. Using the aggregate index, we find evidence that institutional quality is positively linked 
to growth. While institutional instability is negatively related to growth in the baseline case, there 
are indications that the effect can be positive in rich countries, suggesting that institutional reform is 
not necessarily costly even during a transition period. Sensitivity analysis, e.g., decomposing the 
political risk index by using both its constituting components and the results of a principal 
components analysis, using other measures of institutional quality and excluding outliers, confirm 
the general results, with qualifications.  
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1   Introduction 
 
In recent years, a large number of studies provide substantial evidence that the quality of formal institutions 
is an important determinant of economic growth.
1 At one end of the literature, Rodrik et al. (2004) even go 
so far as to claim that “institutions rule”, i.e, that institutional quality trumps other determinants of growth, 
while other studies indicate that not all types of institutions are equally conducive to growth and that factors 
such as human capital are also important (Glaeser et al. 2004; Acemoglu et al. 2005). 
The main reason to expect institutional quality to affect growth positively is that it entails decreased 
transaction costs through reduced uncertainty of economic transactions and productivity enhancing 
incentives. As North (1990, p. 110) puts it: “Third World countries are poor because the institutional 
constraints define a set of payoffs to political/economic activity that do not encourage productive activity.” 
However, to improve institutional quality, a country in general has to go through a series of 
institutional reforms and thereby a period of institutional instability.
2 While high quality institutions are 
growth enhancing because they reduce uncertainty and transaction costs and entail incentives for productive 
behaviour, the effects of institutional change per se and the ensuing instability are theoretically ambiguous. 
Instability that entails change conducive to growth in the long run may come with transitional costs of a size 
that hampers growth in the short run. On the other hand, institutional change may also reflect optimal 
adjustments to changing circumstances, in which case stability would be associated with institutional 
sclerosis and lower growth (cf. Olson 1982). 
Unless institutional instability is entirely inconsequential, one  will get a better estimate of the growth 
effects of institutional quality compared to previous studies when controlling for institutional instability. 
Simultaneously, one needs to take into account if the instability occurs around stable long run levels or are 
accompanied by institutional trends. Against this background, we investigate how institutional quality and 
institutional instability each affect growth rates, something that has not to our knowledge been done before. 
We do this by analyzing 132 countries over four five year periods from 1984 to 2004, using annual data from 
the political risk index from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). We measure institutional 
instability as the coefficient of variation in institutional quality. 
                                                 
1 See, e.g., Knack and Keefer (1995), Keefer and Knack (1997), de Haan and Siermann (1998), Aron (2000), Berggren (2003), 
Claessens and Laeven (2003), Glaeser et al. (2004), Acemoglu and Johnson (2005), Acemoglu et al. (2005), Butkiewicz and 
Yanikkaya (2006) and Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu (2006). 
2 It should be noted from the outset that we refer to instability on two levels: first, by making clear that any institution reduces 
uncertainty for economic decision makers and second, by introducing the notion that any such institution itself can be subject to 
change, which may reduce the uncertainty reducing effect of the institution in question.  
 
In carrying out the analysis, we use Kendall’s Tau to control for the trend in institutional quality 
during each five year period. This setup allows us to separate medium term improvement and deterioration 
of institutional quality from fluctuations around stable levels, thus testing whether instability has an 
independent effect when correcting for the trend. 
Previous studies that use measures of political (i.e., government or regime) instability generally find a 
negative relationship with investments or growth.
3 The studies that look at policy instability, mainly at the 
effects of macroeconomic variation on macroeconomic outcomes, likewise mostly find a negative 
relationship.
4 Hence, there is a growing body of literature that deals with the growth effects of political 
instability or the instability of economic policy and/or macroeconomic variables but no studies, to our 
knowledge, deal specifically with the instability of institutions. 
The paper closest to ours is Pitlik (2002), who argues (and finds empirical support), for the idea that 
volatile liberalization policies depress growth even if the long run trend is towards overall market 
orientation. He tests this by regressing average annual real GDP growth rate between 1975 and 1995 on the 
difference in economic freedom between the same years, the level of economic freedom in 1975, the 
standard deviation of economic freedom and the initial GDP level. 
While the idea is similar to ours, we argue that our approach is more consistent than Pitlik’s. First of 
all, using average annual growth over 20 years as the dependent variable with no other control variables 
except those mentioned above raises concerns on how results should be interpreted. Secondly, including both 
the change in economic freedom and the initial level is econometrically equivalent to using the level of 
economic freedom at the end of the sample period – and in the absence of perfect stability (which one would 
obviously not want in such studies) this cannot explain growth over the sample period. This point was clearly 
made recently by de Haan and Sturm (2006). Thirdly, the economic freedom index is not ideal for testing the 
idea that instability matters, since the index is available only every fifth year before 2000. As such, our 
approach captures the within period instability as well as the overall trend between period ends. 
Our approach, a panel based on yearly ICRG data as a measure of institutional quality, does not suffer 
from any of these problems. The novelty of our approach thus lies in focusing on institutions rather than on 
the effects of macroeconomic or political instability and in investigating the concurrent growth effects of 
institutional quality and instability. Our main findings are that institutional quality is positively linked to 
growth, but that the effect of institutional instability depends on economic development and institutional 
                                                 
3 See, e.g., Aizenmann and Marion (1993), Ramey and Ramey (1995), Brunetti and Weder (1998), Abdiweli (2001), De la Escosura 
and Sanz Villarroya (2004), Chatterjee and Shukayev 2006), Daude and Stein (2007), Merlevede and Schoors (2007) and Aisen and 
Veiga (2008). 
4 See, e.g., de Haan and Siermann (1996), Alesina et al. (1996), Hopenhayn and Muniagurria (1996), Pitlik (2002) and Aysan et al. 
(2007). However, Campos and Nugent (2002) fail to find a negative long run effect on growth. Cf. de Haan and Siermann (1996), de 
Haan (2007) and Jong A Pin (2009), who among other things stress the need to take into account contextual factors and that different 
(types of) countries may not conform to the same linear model.  
 
type.
5 In particular, we speculate whether the positive association between institutional instability and growth 
in some cases is mediated by the ability of actors in an economy to cope with medium run uncertainty 
through insurance and financial markets. 
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we present some brief theoretical considerations 
and hypotheses about the relationship between institutional quality and instability, on the one hand, and 
growth, on the other. Next, we describe our empirical strategy and the data are introduced. In section four, 
we present our main results using the aggregate index and using a set of indices derived by principal 
components analysis. In section five, we perform some additional robustness tests by controlling for other 
institutional indices and outliers. Here we also discuss and attempt to handle potential reverse causality 
problems. Section six concludes. 
 
 
                                                 
5 As for negative growth effects of changes that improve institutional quality, several other studies have found evidence that there are 
transition costs after reforms have been undertaken – see, e.g., Bailamoune Lutz and Addison (2007), Bjørnskov and Kurrild 
Klitgaard (2008) and Méon et al. (2009).  
 
2   Theoretical considerations 
 
As in most work on institutions, we take the work of Douglass North as our starting point. North (1990, pp. 
6, 83–84) states:  
 
The major role of institutions in a society is to reduce uncertainty by establishing a stable (but not necessarily efficient) 
structure to human interaction. The overall stability of an institutional framework makes complex exchange possible across 
both time and space. … [T]his set of stability features in no way guarantees that the institutions relied upon are efficient, 
although stability may be a necessary condition for human interaction, it is certainly not a sufficient condition for efficiency. 
 
Along these lines, we define institutional quality as the degree to which institutions  reduce uncertainty for 
economic decision makers and offer incentives for productive behavior. Higher certainty implies lower 
transaction costs, which makes economic projects more profitable in expectation and hence more likely to be 
undertaken. By offering incentives for productive behavior, efficient institutions stimulate individuals to 
engage in actions where the private return is close to the social return (Demsetz 1967). The two effects, 
reducing uncertainty and providing efficient incentives, are, in our view, jointly necessary and sufficient for 
institutional quality. 
Higher certainty and incentives for productive behavior may arise on the basis of many institutional 
characteristics, not least those relating to the protection of private property rights. Some examples of such 
characteristics are: generality (that equals are treated equally), transparency in public decision making, 
accountability in public decision making and, importantly, an expectation that the institutions will be 
properly implemented and enforced. We expect people, in such a setting, to be relatively willing to engage in 
economic transactions, as they think that if instances of opportunism and cheating by others occur, the 
offenders will be punished and hence be less likely in the first place to engage in such treacherous 
behaviour.
6 Thus, by giving political and economic actors incentives to behave honestly and predictably, 
high quality institutions help ensure that consequences of economic undertakings are more easily foreseen 
and that incentives stimulate productive rather than unproductive behavior (cf. Baumol 1990). Although we 
do not claim that this list of the theoretical possibilities is exhaustive, mechanisms like these are, we suggest, 
plausible for explaining why institutional quality can have a positive effect on growth. 
What can be said about the relationship between growth and institutional change and instability?
7 We 
will argue that this relation is theoretically ambiguous. On the one hand, based on the reasoning above, one 
                                                 
6 See Rothstein (2000, pp. 491–492). On the potential for formal institutions to induce trust in others, see Berggren and Jordahl 
(2006). However, Knack (2002) and Bjørnskov (2007) provide indications to the effect that trust creates institutional quality. 
7 We differentiate between institutional instability and institutional change. Institutional change necessarily entails institutional 
instability (by definition), but a given change in quality between two points in time may be associated with different fluctuations  
 
would expect a negative effect from the mere fact that change and instability increase uncertainty.
8 As such, 
institutional change, even when in a positive direction, could entail transitional costs that lower growth in the 
short run. While a negative effect is to be expected if the change entails reduced institutional quality, even 
instability occurring due to institutional improvements may entail short run costs due to J curve like costs 
arising from uncertainty in a period where confidence in institutional innovations is built. In addition, 
institutional improvements releasing a period of instability often entail the removal of privileges to some 
groups in society, which induces short run costs when resources are re allocated to more productive uses.   
On the other hand, at least two other theoretical mechanisms suggest a positive link between 
institutional change/instability and growth: Weakened interest groups and institutional experimentation. 
First, Olson (1982) stresses that instability may diminish the influence of interest groups, especially if they 
are well established, and if these groups have contributed to maintaining low quality institutions in what may 
in some cases be termed “institutional sclerosis”, institutional instability that changes the political power 
balance could therefore be beneficial for growth over time. Coates et al. (2008) provide recent evidence for 
this type of mechanism. Second, Hayek (1978) and Knight and Johnson (2007) could be taken to suggest that 
since it is difficult to know how to design optimal institutions, a process of institutional experimentation, 
where different institutional set ups are tried and compared, may yield superior economic outcomes. Noting 
that the economic environment continuously changes, such piecemeal experimentation could often reflect 
optimal institutional adjustments. This entails change and instability but may result in higher institutional 
quality and, on net, higher growth rates. 
These considerations connect to a theoretical literature on the relationship between uncertainty and 
investments, which tends to find the relationship ambiguous. The result depends on several factors, such as 
the type of risk, the degree of risk aversion among investors, if markets are complete or incomplete and if 
investments are irreversible or not – see Hartman (1972), Woroch (1988), Craine (1989), and Ferderer 
(1993).
9 In the same vein, Ramey and Ramey (1995, pp. 1138–1139) acknowledge that volatility can affect 
growth in both a negative and positive way – negatively if there are irreversibilities in investment, which 
makes payoffs on investments more uncertain; and positively, if there is a choice between low volatility, 
high expected returns technologies and low volatility, low expected returns technologies; or if higher 
volatility induces more precautionary savings, which may stimulate investment.
10 This type of economic 
uncertainty could also be argued to have its roots in institutional instability. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
during the period of change and hence with different degrees of institutional instability. In the empirical section, when investigating 
the effect of instability, we therefore control for change by including the trend in institutional quality. 
8 We are, in essence, talking about stability on two levels. Institutional quality entails stability for economic decision makers; 
institutional stability entails stability in the institutional quality that entails stability for economic decision makers and, thereby, 
reinforces the stability already expected to be conducive to growth.  
9 The latter, however, also conducts an empirical analysis, suggesting that higher risk decreases investment spending. 
10 Lucas (1987) posits, as a third position, that growth and business cycle fluctuations are unrelated.  
 
In addition, we note that institutional instability, even though measured consistently across countries, 
may not mean the same thing in poor and rich countries – that it may not reflect politically similar 
developments or have the same sources. As such, there is no reason to expect similar effects of institutional 
instability in poor and rich countries. It could be that institutional instability in developing countries reflects 
deeper sources of instability, while institutional instability in developed countries are more likely to reflect 
beneficial institutional adjustment and experimentation. 
Summarizing, this set of theoretical considerations based on the existing literature leads us to the 
expectation that institutional quality is unequivocally positively related to growth. However, the short to 
medium run effects of institutional change and the instability it entails are theoretically ambiguous by being 
associated with both uncertainty and transitional costs but also with positive institutional adjustments to 
changing environments, institutional experimentation and learning from such adjustments and 
experimentation. The nature of the relationship must be settled empirically. 
 
 
3   Data and empirical method 
 
3.1   The main data 
 
As institutional indicators, we use data from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), which consists of 
three indices measuring political risk, economic risk and financial risk. We only use the political risk index, 
which is composed of 12 underlying components listed in Table 1.
11 The reason is that we wish to focus on 
institutions, whereas the other two indices mainly measure economic outcomes, such as international GDP 
ranking, inflation, foreign debt and current account balance. Basing institutional assessments on such 
outcome oriented measures (as, e.g., Huther and Shah, 1998), one risks being plagued by the fact that the 
expectations of economic actors regarding the future are clearly influenced by economic outcomes in the 
past. As noted by Rodrik (2007, p. 188): “[I]nvestors are likely to rate institutional quality high when the 
economy is doing well, regardless of whether causality goes one way or the other.” Even though the political 
risk index is partly based on subjective assessments, using this index only, we hope to reduce the inherent 
endogeneity problem as it does not include any direct measures of economic performance. We therefore also 
                                                 
11 Note that while the name of the index implies that a higher value is associated with higher risk, and hence lower institutional 
quality, the opposite scale holds. I.e., the index is inversely related to political risk. Appendix A outlines the specific elements in the 
12 components.  
 
think that measuring institutional instability with this index is superior to trying to gauge the growth effects 
of direct measures of economic outcome instability.
12  
 
Insert Table 1 here 
 
Our choice of institutional measure is meant to fit the theoretical discussion above. Notably, what is 
rated as high quality institutions are in many cases institutions that increase stability and reduce uncertainty. 
This is clearly reflected in components A, C, I and L, while components B, D, E, G, H and J measure various 
types of (potential) conflicts and tensions in society. Again, high institutional quality can be expected to have 
positive effects on growth, but its variation has ambiguous effects. Component F has clear theoretical 
implications: corruption increases transaction costs and introduces discrepancies between private and social 
returns. Varying levels of corruption adds to this an element of uncertainty, with expected negative growth 
effects. Finally, component K measures if the country is a democracy, an autarchy or something in between. 
Here, neither theory nor empirics is clear: democracies are not necessarily expected to grow faster than non 
democracies.
13  
To sum up, we expect the level of all of the components with the possible exception of component K 
to have a positive effect on growth, while we cannot have unambiguous expectations of how variations (the 
change and the instability) in the components affect growth.
14 In Tables A1 and A2 of Appendix B, 
descriptive statistics for and definitions of all variables used can be found.  
The main points of our strategy are illustrated in Fig. 1, where we plot the scores of legal quality for 
Denmark, Malaysia, the United States and Venezuela. First, Danish legal quality has been high and very 
stable across the entire period 1984–2004, while American legal quality has been of almost the same quality, 
but as the figure illustrates, somewhat more volatile. Simply comparing quality at the beginning of the period 
may therefore give a slightly biased impression of actual institutional performance in the two countries, 
although the differences may seem relatively minor. Second, comparing Malaysia and Venezuela accentuates 
this point as the two countries had almost equal legal quality around 1990. 
                                                 
12 A remaining possible source of endogeneity is that government stability and socioeconomic conditions improve as a result of 
growth, while simultaneously explaining variations in growth performance between countries. 
13 See, e.g., Barro (1996), showing a weak negative effect of democracy on growth, Doucougliagos and Ulubasoglu (2008) suggests a 
small positive effect, and Acemoglu et al. (2008), showing that the relationship between income and democracy is probably not 
causal. Specific to our aim of this paper, Przeworski and Limongi (1993) stress that autocracies may be better at reaching and 
implementing efficient decisions on policy and institutional reform without having to consider pressure from special interest groups 
or short term voter considerations (see also Bjørnskov and Kurrild Klitgaard 2008). 
14 Measuring the medium run instability of partially subjective indicators could offer a benefit as year to year changes of such 
indices tend to be a mix of real changes and inherent uncertainty of the actual status of the country in a given year. As such, the 
instability of the ICRG measures reflects institutional uncertainty that market actors face on the same terms as the professional 
evaluations of the ICRG.  
 
 
Insert Fig. 1 here 
 
The legal quality of the Venezuelan system has, on the other hand, been less stable than its Malaysian 
counterpart across the entire period and has obviously been characterized by a long run downward trend. 
Yet, if either the initial level of 1990 or the average is used, one is likely to overestimate the positive impact 
of Venezuela’s legal institutions compared to Malaysia, a disparity reflected in the difference between the 
Venezuelan average annual growth rate during 1984 2004 of  0.36 percent and the Malaysian average of 3.2 
percent in the same period. Likewise, comparing the instability of the institutions of the two countries can be 
misleading as Malaysia has seen instability around a relatively stable long run level while the instability of 
Venezuelan institutions is a reflection of a steady deterioration. One therefore ideally has to take into account 
both the level and the trend of the quality of such institutions in order to get a full estimate of the institutional 
impact. 
 
3.2   Estimation strategy 
 
We estimate regressions as in equation 1, where Gr is the growth rate of real GDP per capita, X is a set of 
standard controls, Q is institutional quality, CVQ is the coefficient of variation of Q, D are time  and country 
fixed effects and ε is a noise term. In further analysis, we expand the specification to equation 2 where we 
add Kendall’s Tau as a measure of the institutional trend, TRQ as specified in equation 2.
15  
 
ε δ γ β α + + + + + = D CV Q X Gr Q       (1) 
ε ϕ δ γ β α + + + + + + = D TR CV Q X Gr Q Q     (2) 
 
The control variables in our specification are kept to a minimum of factors that are broadly used in 
growth studies. In all regressions, the X vector consists of the logarithm of initial GDP per capita to account 
for conditional convergence, government expenditures as percent of total GDP, openness (imports plus 
exports as percent of total GDP), and the investment share of GDP. As such, we capture the most important 
                                                 
15 Kendall’s Tau is a non parametric trends measure calculated as the sum of changes between any points within a five year period. 
Positive changes are given the value 1, negative  1 and pairs with the same institutional value 0. This means that Kendall’s Tau will 
be smaller if an institutional trend only occurs between, e.g., the first two years of a period, in which case we would also expect a 
smaller impact across the entire five year period. As such, using this measure also makes our estimates less sensitive to the particular 
choice of periods as the measure is smaller if changes are distributed partially across two five year periods. The measure is also 
insensitive to missing observations, including starting and ending points.  
 
determinants of economic growth while still keeping the specification sufficiently parsimonious to include a 
large and diverse set of countries (in line with Barro 1997). 
Our full sample covers 132 countries with a political risk rating in at least one of the four time periods 
1984 1989, 1989 1994, 1994 1999 and 1999 2004; the countries are listed in Table A3 of Appendix B. As 
such, growth is measured as the five year average, as is investments, government expenditures and openness 
to trade. 40 of these countries have a GDP per capita above 14,000 USD, which we define as our high 
income subsample for which determinants of growth and institutional impacts may differ from the full 
sample (cf. Keefer and Knack 1995 and de Haan and Siermann 1996).  
 
 
4   Institutions and growth: empirical results 
 
Using the data described above, we derive a series of fixed effects generalized least squares estimates. 
Results are reported for the full sample and for two sub samples of countries with a GDP per capita below 
and above 14,000 USD, respectively. This corresponds to dividing the sample into a big group (n=100) of 
poor and middle income countries and a smaller group (n=40) of rich countries (including the OECD and 
equally rich countries). We split the sample as citizens and market actors in high income countries have 
access to more complete insurance markets, financial instruments in deeper markets as well as better market 
information, and are therefore substantially better suited to handle institutional instability without real losses 
in the short to medium run.
16  
 
4.1   Results using the aggregate political risk index 
 
The results of employing the aggregate political risk index from the ICRG as the measure of institutional 
quality are reported in Table 2. First of all, the estimates confirm a number of standard findings: openness to 
trade and investments are positively associated with growth in both the full sample as well as in the two 
subsamples. Investments, however, are more important in relatively poor countries in absolute terms, 
consistent with the notion that input growth becomes less important as economies evolve, while the relative 
effects of a standard deviation change of the investment rate are similar across levels of development, 
reflecting that even though the point estimate is smaller in more developed economies, so is the variation in 
investment rates. The statistical insignificance of government expenditures in the full sample most likely 
                                                 
16 We experimented with splitting our sample in democratic and semi democratic countries. However, since the samples split 
according to economic development and democratic status are remarkably similar, we obtained very similar results, and therefore 
opted for the more transparent split based on economic development. Results also remain qualitatively the same when choosing a 
slightly higher or lower threshold.   
 
reflects a positive association in relatively poor societies and a negative association with growth in rich 
societies (cf. Fölster and Henrekson 2001 and Schaltegger and Torgler 2006). Finally, all estimates indicate 
conditional convergence at speeds similar to standard results (cf. Barro 1997).
17 As these results are 
qualitatively and quantitatively similar throughout, with the exception of the positive association of 
government expenditures in poor countries that turns out to be statistically fragile, we do not report them in 
the following tables although all control variables are included in all tests. 
 
Insert Table 2 here 
 
Institutional quality, as measured by the political risk index (which effectively is a measure of the 
absence of risk), is significantly and positively related to growth, while institutional instability, as measured 
by the coefficient of variation, has a negative sign but no significant effect on growth. Yet, including 
instability (not shown) reduces the coefficient on institutional quality by about ten percent. When controlling 
for the five year trend, we find that instability is significantly negatively related to growth; moreover the 
coefficient on institutional quality is further reduced. Together, these results suggest that institutional quality 
is good for growth, but that institutional instability is costly in a five year perspective. In addition, the results 
suggest that institutional improvements (trends) are associated with medium run costs. 
For poor countries, institutional quality appears to be even more important for growth as a one 
standard deviation increase results in a growth gain of roughly one quarter of a standard deviation, but 
instability is rather costly. In rich countries, quality and instability are not significant. A likely explanation 
for this could in principle be that most rich countries in our sample have very high quality and low 
instability. However, the institutional trend is negatively related to growth in rich countries as well, and an 
alternative explanation for the non result might be that only a smaller number of parts of the political risk 
index are associated with growth for rich countries.
18 
 
                                                 
17 Interestingly, excluding the initial GDP per capita renders most measures of institutional quality insignificant. As such, one could 
interpret these and other results in the literature on institutions and growth as suggestive of club convergence in institutional clubs 
(Galor 1996). 
18 Furthermore, when excluding the investment rate, as suggested by de Haan and Siermann (1996, p. 342), the institutional 
coefficients do not change much. We therefore find no evidence of institutional quality, instability or change affecting economic 
growth through the investment rate and consequently interpret our findings as evidence of the importance of institutions for total 
factor productivity.   
 
4.2   Results using principal components analysis 
 
Aron (2000, p. 115) stresses the importance of using institutional measures carefully as many studies in the 
growth literature employ an “often arbitrary aggregation of different components” when forming 
institutional indices.  First, such indices are based on the rather strong assumption that one can aggregate a 
set of subindices, such as the 12 indices entering the full political risk index, into one, unidimensional index, 
i.e., aggregation assumes that the set of subindices only contains one institutional dimension. Second, even if 
the first assumption can be defended, most resulting indices effectively assume that all subindices are equally 
important, i.e., that an aggregation scheme with equal weights is valid. A well known problem with so called 
“kitchen sink” indices like the political risk index therefore arises, as estimates are likely to be biased if some 
of the components entering the index are associated with an outcome variables while others are not, in which 
case both inherent problems are likely to bias the point estimate towards zero. To remedy this problem, we 
use principal components analysis (PCA) to probe deeper into the data variation.  
This approach has two advantages. First, by using PCA we let the structure of the data determine how 
components are pooled to form separate indices instead of forcing a specific organization on the data. 
Second, the principal components are by construction orthogonal, which means that we do not encounter 
problems of testing partially correlated indices against each other but can separate types of institutions 
without such statistical problems. We calculate the coefficients of variation of the resulting principal 
components within each five year period using the variation of the 12 political risk index components 
weighted by the same scheme as in the PCA scores of institutional quality. As such, we therefore also allow 
the heterogeneity of the instability inherent in the data to determine our indicators.  
The results of the principal components analysis are reported in Table 3. 
 
Insert Table 3 here 
 
The table shows that the 12 components of the political risk index do not load onto a single factor but 
split quite nicely into three underlying dimensions explaining approximately 70 percent of the variation of 
the original data. Given that the constituting components of the political risk index derive from dichotomous 
data, the precision of the PCA must probably be deemed satisfactory. Although one of the main potential 
difficulties with PCA is the interpretation of the results we believe that the analysis yields a set of indices 
that can readily be interpreted as indices of “legal quality”, “policy quality” and “social tensions”; the basis 
for this interpretation is presented in Appendix C.
19 
                                                 
19 In the following, we use the component solution, rotated to form three orthogonal components. As such, we base our analyses on 
the implicit assumption that separating the institutional factors perfectly is a valid strategy, an assumption which could of course be 
questioned. However, further analysis with the same data in Toft (2008) strongly suggests that allowing for even large amounts of  
 
Before going to the regressions, we note that the PCA indices can be used to illustrate the potential 
pitfalls of not treating institutional quality as a multifaceted concept, and the need to separate quality and 
instability. To take an example, Denmark receives the second largest score in the latest period for legal 
quality and is the fifth most stable country in that area. However, it is only number 71 in terms of the quality 
of policy and number 80 in terms of social tensions, and receives relatively unstable scores on both these 
dimensions, placed at number 50 and 71, respectively. Panama, on the other hand, is placed at number 52 on 
the legal dimension but has the seventh most stable legal environment. These countries exemplify how 
quality and stability are only imperfectly associated: the correlation between legal quality and legal 
instability is  0.50, that between policy quality and policy instability is  0.61, and that between the level of 
social tensions and its stability is  0.40. 
The regression results, linking the three institutional features to growth, are presented in Table 4. 
Using the three indices from the PCA increases the explanatory power of the specification substantially – R
2 
is consistently higher in this table than in any previous tests – and it provides more detailed results.
20 
 
Insert Table 4 here 
 
In terms of the level of institutional quality, the findings rather clearly point towards the importance of 
the first two dimensions, especially the first one, for growth in the full sample. We have interpreted these as 
a legal quality dimension and a policy quality dimension. In the subsample consisting of low and middle 
income countries, these two dimensions are roughly of equal importance, as a one standard deviation change 
of each is associated with a growth increase of approximately 1.3 percentage points (roughly the difference 
between present day quality in Jordan and Lithuania in legal quality, and between Serbia and India in policy 
quality), all other things being equal. However, in the high income subsample, only the legal quality 
component is statistically significantly associated with growth, and with an even larger coefficient, which 
indicates that a one standard deviation change to legal institutions in rich countries (the difference between 
present day Spain and Norway) is associated with an increase of growth of approximately 72 percent of a 
standard deviation, or 1.6 percentage points, all other things being equal. Compared to the smaller 
coefficients, and in particular the insignificant relation between growth and the full political risk index in 
Table 2, this exercise clearly emphasizes the risks of using overly aggregated kitchen sink indices. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
obliqueness when rotating components leaves the results virtually unchanged. Furthermore, the solution is robust to excluding either 
one of the 12 components, i.e.. single questionable indicators do not matter, and remain qualitatively the same when we restrict the 
PCA to one of our two subsamples. 
20 Two countries (the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan) leave the sample when we apply the PCA scores as they 
consistently lack data on specific components of the political risk index.  
 
Regarding institutional instability and the trend, these seem to matter mostly in rich countries. A 
positive sign for the CV coefficients implies support for Olson’s (1982) concern with excessive stability, 
whereas a negative sign implies a negative effect of increased transaction costs due to a rise in uncertainty. In 
poor countries, the instability of policy quality is negatively related to growth; in the rich countries, the 
instability of legal quality and policy quality are positively, while the instability of social tensions is 
negatively, related to growth. The associations between institutional instability and growth are also of 
economic significance. For example, a one standard deviation increase of legal instability in rich countries, 
roughly the difference between extremely stable Finland and Belgium, is associated with a improvement in 
the growth rate of about one third of a standard deviation. Conversely, a one standard deviation change in the 
instability of social tensions, the difference between present day Denmark and Austria, is associated with a 
growth decline of almost one half of a standard deviation. 
Furthermore, the trend in policy quality exhibits a significantly positive association with growth, 
indicating that such changes have short run effects whereas the long run level of policy quality is of no 
significant relevance in developed countries. The trend in social tensions is, in contrast, negatively related to 
growth. Calculating the average transitional gain of a positive trend in policy quality through a five year 
period from the present estimates suggests that they approximate 200 USD per capita per year. The similar 
medium run costs of improving institutions related to social tensions are approximately 90 USD per capita, 
averaged across a five year period. As such, the results suggest that improvements in the policy dimension in 
rich countries seem to be associated with higher growth, although only through a short run activity effect, 
while improvements in the social tensions dimension may even be costly in terms of growth although the 
actual costs seem negligible.  
We devote the next section to exploring the robustness of these results. 
 
 
5   Robustness tests 
 
First, we test whether the main results are robust to including the level and coefficient of variation of four 
alternative indicators of institutional quality: the Gastil index of political rights and civil liberties, Henisz’s 
(2002) “Political Constraints V” indicator of veto player strength, the Polity IV index of democracy, and the 
Herfindahl index of the legislature as an index of the level of political competition; Table A2 in Appendix B 
provides further information on sources and definitions. As such, by including alternative indicators with 
established interpretations we test whether our results simply proxy for effects of, e.g., democracy or 
constraints on policy makers, although we also note that the simultaneous inclusion of alternative 
institutional measures most likely causes some variance inflation. We also test what happens when potential 
outlier observations are removed from the sample and whether the results are robust to excluding the  
 
observations with the best and worst institutions. Lastly, we try to see whether there are signs of 
endogeneity. All tests are performed for the political risk index and the three indices derived by PCA; 
specifics are reported in appendices. 
First, the results obtained using the political risk index are relatively robust to including other 
institutional indicators, especially in the case of poor countries, as can be seen when comparing Tables A4 
and A5 of Appendix B with columns 4 and 6 of Table 2. In poor countries, eight out of 12 coefficients (three 
for each of the four indices) have the same sign and statistical significance as before. For the rich countries, 
the results are more sensitive, as only three out of 12 coefficients have the same sign and statistical 
significance as before. In poor countries, institutional quality as measured by the political risk index always 
has a significantly positive effect on growth, and the same holds for rich countries, except when the Gastil 
index is included. A similar pattern holds for institutional instability as measured by the coefficient of 
variation, but the trend more rarely obtains statistical significance. Whenever the alternative indicators are 
significant, institutional quality is good for growth, while institutional instability is costly. 
Testing instead for outlier influences, we verify that the results are not driven by such observations, 
defined as observations with a residual of more than ±1.5 standard deviations. These tests simply reconfirm 
the main results in Table 2. We therefore note that the results of employing the political risk index are 
relatively robust, including the “non result” that overall institutional quality appears inconsequential in 
relatively rich countries. Excluding the ten percent of observations in the tails of the distribution of political 
risk, and thereby testing whether the results are driven by extreme observations, yields similar results with 
the exception that the effects of political risk in poor countries becomes insignificant. 
We perform the same type of robustness analysis for the setting using the PCA derived indices – see 
Tables A6 and A7 of Appendix B and compare with columns 4 and 6 of Table 4. For the poor countries, out 
of 36 coefficients (nine for each of the four indices), 25 have the same sign and statistical significance as 
before. For the rich countries, the corresponding figure is 20 out of 36, implying less robustness although we 
should stress that the problems of inflation variance when including multiple institutional indicators may be 
particularly acute in this sample. The result that only legal quality is significant in rich countries while both 
legal and policy quality are significant in poor countries also turns out to be robust when excluding outliers, 
as do the results pertaining to instability and institutional trends. As such, the tables show that most main 
findings are largely robust to including the quality and coefficient of variation of the Gastil index, the 
Political Constraints V index, the Polity IV index and the Herfindahl index.
21 The most important difference 
is that the policy quality trend does not attain statistical significance. Contrary to the results using the simple 
                                                 
21 When adding the Polity IV index of democracy in the specification with the three PCA dimensions, the results for the Polity index 
are probably a result of a few outlier observations, as only six countries in this subsample have seen any changes: Bahrain, Oman and 
Kuwait that are oil countries, and Israel, France and South Korea. As such, this result does not generalize.  
 
political risk index, these estimates do not seem to be driven by extreme observations as the estimates are 
stable to excluding the tails of the distribution of institutional quality. 
Further robustness tests consisting in excluding single regions and countries with few observations in 
general reconfirm the main results. In the full sample, the effect of the political risk index proves to be 
sensitive to including African countries: if they are excluded, it fails the 10 percent level of significance. In 
the poor sample, the effect of the political risk trends disappears when excluding Asian countries, while in 
the rich sample, no result associated with the political risk index is robust to this exercise. Using the PCA 
indices instead, the effect of the instability of policy quality fails significance when excluding observations 
from either the post communist countries, Sub Saharan Africa, the Middle East and North African region, 
Asia or countries with less than three observations in the dataset. What is more, excluding the Sub Saharan 
African countries – i.e., the absolutely poorest countries in the sample – yields the legal quality index 
insignificant. 
As our last exercise, we try to control for possible endogeneity and simultaneity in two ways. As is 
almost always the case, we note that the institutional measures may lag rather than lead growth rates for 
several reasons. First, simple arguments could be made why institutions might improve when the economy 
grows. For example, the quality of legal systems and public bureaucracies could be constrained by available 
resources, in which case growth would lead to better institutions by alleviating this constraint. Second, we 
note the risk when using subjective or quasi subjective indices that evaluations of institutional quality are 
affected by expectations of economic growth in the immediate future. If these expectations are on average 
correct, higher growth rates in the short run would simply be reflected in our measures of institutional quality 
instead of causing actual quality. In this case, we would expect this reflection to show up in higher 
investment rates to the extent that the expectations are shared by the market. 
To investigate causality in a tentative way, we first include lagged growth rates, based on the simple 
argument that if higher growth rates cause rather than follow higher institutional quality and affect 
institutional stability, including the lagged dependent variable would pick up at least some of this effect. The 
estimates, which we report in Table A8 in Appendix D, in general do not suggest that endogeneity is a major 
concern. Using the full political risk index, we note that while the estimates in the full sample and the rich 
sub sample are unchanged and leave the lagged growth rate insignificant, the inclusion of lagged growth in 
the poor sub sample turns out to be significant and renders the political risk trend insignificant. Employing 
the three institutional factors derived by principal components analysis again provides a better fit and yields 
the main findings somewhat less affected. In the full sample, we find no significant differences although the 
point estimates of trends in policy quality and social tensions are slightly smaller. The results in the rich sub 
sample are entirely unaffected while the instability of policy quality in the poor sub sample is rendered 
insignificant. With few exceptions, this exercise therefore does not suggest major endogeneity problems. 
With respect to the possibility that our estimates suffer from simultaneity bias due to institutional indices  
 
reflecting market expectations, the exclusion of investment rates does not affect our estimates of institutional 
effects (not shown). Given that such expectations would most likely show up in the investment rate instead 
of affecting productivity, we do not believe that this is a major worry. 
Our second test is an attempt to instrument for our variables of interest. We must note that, as is often 
the case, our search for valid instrumental variables that account for the variation of institutional quality and 
instability over time has proven to be unsuccessful. What variation could best be explained by any 
instrumental variables proved to be lagged measures of institutional quality derived from PCA and lagged 
growth rates. We therefore report estimates using random effects with and without our instrumental variables 
and focus only on the results that are qualitatively similar across both random and fixed effects estimates.  
The results reported in Table A9 in Appendix D nonetheless suggest that our main estimates are 
causal, insofar as the use of lagged values of institutional quality and lagged growth are valid. In the poor 
sub sample, policy quality fails significance while the remaining central results again are approximately the 
same. As such, while we must emphasize that the strength of these tests is fairly limited, whatever 
endogeneity test proved practicable with these data do not reject that the main estimates may be causal.
22 
As the main results are relatively robust, especially with regard to the important role of institutional 
quality, and may cautiously be interpreted as causal, we move on to discussing the implications of the 
findings in the final section. 
 
 
6   Concluding remarks 
 
The burgeoning literature on economic growth has in recent years documented a close association between 
institutional quality and how rapidly countries develop economically. However, to achieve high quality of 
institutions, for example protecting property rights or constraining political decision making, countries need 
to go through periods of institutional change and instability. Even among rich countries, some have more 
volatile institutions than others, yet economic theory provides only ambiguous insights as to how change and 
instability might affect the economy. While uncertainty about the future institutional framework intuitively 
would be associated with larger transaction costs and thus be harmful to growth, it could also reflect positive 
                                                 
22 It should also be noted that we succeeded to some extent in identifying the variation over time in legal quality in the rich sub 
sample with a set of instruments consisting of lagged values of legal and policy quality, lagged growth and the percent of United 
Nations General Assembly votes in which a country voted with the US in a given five year period; the latter data are from Voeten 
(2004). These instruments also passed a Sargan test (p<.92) and yielded a significant estimate of 2.499 (standard error 1.122). 
Alternative tests using urbanization rates and a simple measure of information flows (the number of telephone lines per 100 
inhabitants) yielded very similar results. The same instruments only identified a small proportion of the other institutional measures 
in either sample.  
 
institutional adjustments to shifting circumstances. Likewise, institutional improvements are in the long run 
going to lead to higher growth but may also imply transitional costs in the short to medium run. 
Consequently, this paper has explored the full association between institutional quality, institutional 
instability, institutional medium run trends and economic growth. We employ the political risk index from 
the International Country Risk Guide as well as three indices aggregated from its 12 constituting components 
by the use of principal components analysis, noting that if aggregated indices hide multiple dimensions, 
estimates of their effects are likely to suffer a downwards bias. The empirical results rather clearly support a 
sizeable effect of high quality institutions on growth in a panel of 132 countries, while the effects of 
institutional instability and change are in general ambiguous. Employing the three composite indices 
measuring legal quality, policy quality and social tensions, the results, e.g., indicate that legal quality is 
conducive to growth in both poor and rich countries, that policy improvements are positively related to 
growth in rich countries, and that policy instability hampers growth in poor countries. Furthermore, we find 
that deteriorating social tensions are associated with decline, as is their instability..  
However, the results suggest that some instability of legal and policy quality is on average conducive 
to economic growth in rich countries. Our findings therefore provide more support for the positive effects of 
institutional adjustment and, more generally, for avoiding Olsonian institutional sclerosis, than for the 





The components of the International Country Risk Guide’s political risk index
23 
 
A. Government stability 
Assesses the government’s ability to carry out its declared program(s), and its ability to stay in office. The 
risk rating assigned is the sum of three subcomponents: Government Unity, Legislative Strength and Popular 
Support. 
B. Socioeconomic conditions 
Assesses the socioeconomic pressures at work in society that could constrain government action or fuel 
social dissatisfaction. There are three subcomponents: Unemployment, Consumer Confidence and Poverty. 
C. Investment profile 
Assesses factors affecting the risk to investment that are not covered by other political, economic and 
financial risk components. The subcomponents are: Contract Viability/Expropriation, Profits Repatriation  
and Payment Delays  
D. Internal conflict 
political violence in the country and its actual or potential impact on governance. The subcomponents are: 
Civil War/Coup Threat, Terrorism/Political Violence and Civil Disorder. 
E. External conflict 
                                                 
23 A full description can be found at http://www.prsgroup.com/icrg_methodology.aspx  
 
Assesses the risk to the incumbent government from foreign action, ranging from non violent external 
pressure (diplomatic pressures, withholding of aid, trade restrictions, territorial disputes, sanctions, etc) to 
violent external pressure (cross border conflicts to all out war). 
The subcomponents are: War, Cross Border Conflict and Foreign Pressures 
F. Corruption 
Assesses corruption within the political system. No subcomponents 
G. Military in politics 
Assesses the degree of military participation in politics and the higher level of political risk associated with 
such interventions. No subcomponents 
H. Religious tensions 
Assesses religious tensions from the domination of society and/or governance by a single religious group that 
seeks to replace civil law by religious law and to exclude other religions from the political and/or social 
process and the suppression of religious freedom. No subcomponents 
I. Law and order 
The Law sub component is an assessment of the strength and impartiality of the legal system. The Order 
sub component is an assessment of popular observance of the law. 
J. Ethnic tensions 
Assesses the degree of tension within a country attributable to racial, nationality, or language divisions. 
K. Democratic accountability 
Assesses how responsive government is to its people, on the basis that the less responsive it is, the more 
likely it is that the government will fall, peacefully in a democratic society, but possibly violently in a non 
democratic one. Assessment is done by classifying countries using the following types of governance: 
Alternating Democracy, Dominated Democracy, De facto One Party State, De jure One Party state, and 
Autarchy. 
L. Bureaucracy quality 
Assesses the institutional strength and quality of the bureaucracy. Countries that lack the cushioning effect of 
a strong bureaucracy are considered worse because a change in government can be traumatic in terms of 










Interpreting the PCA indices 
 
One of the potential problems associated with PCA is that the resulting indices can be difficult to interpret. 
To gain an impression of what the three indices obtained from the PCA actually measure, we therefore 
explore their correlations with a set of known institutional indicators.  
 
The three resulting indices all correlate with the Gastil index at 0.59, 0.45 and 0.27, respectively, and 
the Gastil index in turn correlates with the overall political risk index at 0.77.
24 However, focusing on the 
first dimension suggests a simple interpretation as this dimension loads heavily on Law and order, 
Democratic accountability, Military in politics, Socioeconomic conditions, Corruption and Bureaucratic 
quality, all of which either measure the quality and capacity of the legal system or consequences and 
reflections of such quality and capacity. Furthermore, the correlation between our first dimension and the 
second area of the Economic Freedom of the World Index (EFI), Legal structure and security of property 
rights (see Gwartney and Lawson 2007), which is often treated as the most transparent and arguably the 
“cleanest” measure of the rule of law, is 0.73, making it intuitively sensible to interpret this dimension as a 
“legal dimension” of institutional quality.
25 It should also be noted that this component is similar to the single 
governance component extracted through the same method in Seldadyo et al. (2007). 
The second dimension includes heavy loadings of countries’ Investment profile and their Government 
stability. The correlation between this dimension and area five of the EFI, Regulation of credit, labour and 
business, is 0.42, while the partial correlation, when controlling for area two of the EFI, is 0.34. Adding the 
two areas of the EFI to the PCA shows that area two exclusively loads onto a factor including the same 
ICRG components as the first dimension (with a loading of 0.78), which we term a legal dimension, while 
area five loads moderately onto the first dimension and heavily onto the second dimension (loading 0.63). 
We therefore interpret the second dimension as a measure of the quality of regulatory policy, in short a 
“policy dimension”. 
Finally, the third dimension consists of heavy loadings of the ICRG components on External and 
Internal conflict, Religious and Ethnic tensions and Law and order, and correlates at  0.37 with the ethnic 
diversity index from Alesina et al. (2003). This final index can therefore be interpreted as a measure of both 
actual and latent conflicts and tensions in society, including socio political instability and social unrest (cf. 





Insert Tables A8–A9 
                                                 
24 The Gastil index is composed as an average of two subindices, measuring the extent of political rights and the protection of basic 
civil liberties, both on a scale from one (full rights and liberties) to seven (no rights and liberties). It should be noted that the 
combined Gastil index is often used as both a measure of democracy and of institutional quality, even though it can be criticized on 
both counts (cf. Munck and Verkuilen 2002). 
25 An often used alternative is the Heritage Foundation (2007) index of economic freedom (distributed between one, indicating full 
freedom, and five, no freedom) although it is only available since 1995. The correlation between the first principal component and 
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Fig. 1   Legal quality 1984 2004, four examples. Notes. For interpretative convenience, we have rescaled indices in this figure to be 
within the same interval as the original ICRG components.  
 
Table 1   The components of the political risk index of the ICRG 
Components     Components  
A   Government stability  G  Military in politics 
B  Socioeconomic conditions  H  Religious tensions 
C  Investment profile  I  Law and order 
D  Internal conflict  J  Ethnic tensions 
E  External conflict  K  Democratic accountability 
F  Corruption  L  Bureaucracy quality 
  
 
Table 2   Growth effects of institutional quality, instability and trend – using the aggregate political risk index 
  All  Poor  Rich 
  1  2  3  4  5  6 








































































Political risk trend     3.019** 
(1.245) 
   2.702* 
(1.481) 
   4.588** 
(1.902) 
             
Observations  469  451  328  311  141  140 
Countries  132  132  102  101  40  40 
Between R square  .001  .000  .012  .007  .326  .323 
Within R square  .348  .368  .349  .378  .656  .676 
F statistic  19.44  18.01  12.96  12.13  19.45  18.79 
Hausmann test  28.42***  389.24***  85.16***  445.91***  62.39***  40.71*** 
Notes. *** (**) [*] denote significance at p<.01 (p<.05) [p<.10]; all regressions are GLS with country and period fixed effects. 
  
 
Table 3   Principal components analysis: loadings and uniqueness 
  Component loadings  Uniqueness 
  1 (”legal”)  2 (”policy”)  3 (”tensions”)   
Investment profile  .353  .826  .072  .187 
Government stability   .032  .871  .239  .184 
External conflict  .207  .266  .680  .424 
Internal conflict  .401  .395  .690  .207 
Religious tensions  .227   .081  .713  .433 
Ethnic tensions  .156  .218  .714  .418 
Law and order  .610  .339  .459  .303 
Democratic accountablity  .668  .060  .307  .456 
Military in politics  .691  .249  .400  .300 
Socioeconomic conditions  .723  .406   .009  .312 
Corruption  .813   .179  .291  .222 
Bureaucracy quality  .874  .215  .133  .172 
Notes. Loadings in bold are referred to in the text as “heavy” loadings, i.e., the major influences on the PCA scores. Loadings in 
italics refer to indices with intermediate influence. The component solution has been rotated using the Varimax technique. 
  
 
Table 4   Growth effects of institutional quality, instability and trend – using the three PCA indices 
  All  Poor  Rich 
  1  2  3  4  5  6 








































































Legal quality trend    .107 
(.263) 
  .069 
(.328) 
   .188 
(.313) 
Policy quality trend    .639*** 
(.237) 
  .477 
(.322) 
  .888*** 
(.236) 
Social tensions trend     .748** 
(.308) 
   .498 
(.423) 
   .461* 
(.251) 
             
Observations  457  457  317  317  140  140 
Countries  130  130  100  100  40  40 
Between R square  .002  .002  .000  .000  .334  .306 
Within R square  .377  .399  .403  .411  .767  .802 
F statistic  14.64  12.90  10.58  8.78  21.89  21.29 
Hausmann test  125.46***  61.88***  64.98***  55.44***  80.89***  21.55 
Notes. *** (**) [*] denote significance at p<.01 (p<.05) [p<.10]; all regressions are GLS with country and period fixed effects. 
Control variables are used throughout but are not reported for reasons of space.  
 
Table A1   Descriptive statistics 
  Mean  Std. dev.  Minimum  Maximum  Obs. 
Growth rate  1.545  3.228   9.746  14.148  469 
Log initial GDP  8.614  1.127  6.064  10.709  469 
Openness  77.319  77.319  11.298  387.424  484 
Government share  21.304  9.048  3.954   64.847  484 
Investment share  15.424  8.089  1.336  44.950  484 
Q 1  0  1   2.263  2.168  484 
Q 2  0  1   2.381  2.893  484 
Q 3  0  1   3.466  2.003  484 
CV Q 1  .087  .066  0  .347  484 
CV Q 2  .105  .069  0  .435  484 
CV Q 3  .081  .065  0  .410  484 
Q 1 trend  .099  .574   1  1  484 
Q 2 trend  .227  .658   1  1  484 
Q 3 trend  .126  .537   1  1  484 
Gastil index  3.529  1.941  1  7  471 
CV Gastil index  .071  .093  0  .615  471 
Gastil trend  1.016  .150  .158  1.611  471 
Polity IV democracy index  2.889  7.105   10  10  461 
CV Polity IV  .095  1.526   7.348  25.573  461 
Polity trend  .979  2.267   15.5  40  461 
Political constraints V  .136  .313  0  2  469 
CV political constraints V  .441  .319  0  .893  469 
Constraints trend  .940  .329   1  2.555  469 
  
 
Table A2   Variable definitions  
  Definition  Source 
Growth rate  Five year average growth in GDP per capita  Summers et al. (2006) 
Log initial GDP  Logarithm to GDP per capita, initial in each five year period, 
denoted in purchasing power adjusted 2000 US dollars 
Summers et al. (2006) 
Openness  Export plus imports as percentage of GDP  Summers et al. (2006) 
Government share  Government expenditures, net of all transfers, as percentage of 
GDP 
Summers et al. (2006) 
Investment share  Investments as percentage of GDP  Summers et al. (2006) 
Q 1  Principal component score, see section 5  Own, based on ICRG 
Q 2  Principal component score, see section 5  Own, based on ICRG 
Q 3  Principal component score, see section 5  Own, based on ICRG 
Gastil index  Index of political rights and civil liberties; lower scores mean 
stronger protection of rights and liberties 
Freedom House (2007) 
Polity IV democracy index  Index of three essential elements of democracy: 1) institutions 
and procedures enabling citizens to freely express their 
preferences for policies and leaders; 2) effective constraints on 
the exercise of power by the executive; and 3) the civil liberties 
of citizens to participate in the political process 
Marshall and Jaggers 
(2004) 
Political constraints V 
Index employing the same data and logic as Political constraints 




Index capturing the degree of formal political competition, 
calculated as the sum of squares of the share of seats held by any 
party in parliament 





Table A3   Countries included in our sample 
Albania  Greece  Panama 
Algeria  Guatemala  Papua New Guinea 
Argentina  Guinea  Paraguay 
Armenia  Guinea Bissau  Peru 
Australia  Honduras  Philippines 
Austria  Hong Kong  Poland 
Azerbaijan  Hungary  Portugal 
Bahamas  Iceland  Qatar 
Bahrain  India  Romania 
Bangladesh  Indonesia  Russia 
Belarus  Iran  Saudi Arabia 
Belgium  Iraq  Senegal 
Bolivia  Ireland  Serbia Montenegro 
Botswana  Israel  Sierra Leone 
Brazil  Italy  Singapore 
Brunei  Jamaica  Slovak Republic 
Bulgaria  Japan  Slovenia 
Burkina Faso  Jordan  Somalia 
Cameroon  Kazakstan  South Africa 
Canada  Kenya  South Korea 
Chile  Kuwait  Spain 
China  Latvia  Sri Lanka 
Colombia  Lebanon  Sudan 
Congo  Lithuania  Suriname 
Congo, DR  Luxembourg  Sweden 
Costa Rica  Madagascar  Switzerland 
Côte d'Ivoire  Malawi  Syria 
Croatia  Malaysia  Tanzania 
Cuba  Malta  Thailand 
Cyprus  Mexico  Togo 
Czech Republic  Moldova  Trinidad & Tobago 
Denmark  Mongolia  Tunisia 
Dominican Republic  Morocco  Turkey 
Ecuador  Mozambique  Uganda 
Egypt  Namibia  Ukraine 
El Salvador  Netherlands  United Arab Emirates 
Estonia  New Zealand  United Kingdom 
Ethiopia  Nicaragua  United States 
Finland  Niger  Uruguay 
France  Nigeria  Venezuela 
Gabon  North Korea  Vietnam 
Gambia  Norway  Yemen 
Germany  Oman  Zambia 
Ghana  Pakistan  Zimbabwe 
Notes. Countries in italics are included in the high income subsample. 
  
 
Table A4   Growth effects of institutional quality, instability and trend – using the aggregate political risk index along with 
alternative institutional indicators 
  Poor  Rich  Poor  Rich  Poor  Rich 
Alternative:  Gastil index  Political Constraints V  Polity IV index 
  Full baseline included 








































































             
Observations  307  136  305  130  303  121 
Countries  99  39  100  38  99  35 
Between R square  .007  .176  .007  .143  .005  .083 
Within R square  .371  .706  .366  .769  .355  .776 
F statistic  8.84  15.50  8.54  20.29  8.08  19.48 
Hausmann test  38.31***  78.86***  206.08***  176.21***  97.80***  163.23*** 
Notes. *** (**) [*] denote significance at p<.01 (p<.05) [p<.10]; all regressions are GLS with country and period fixed effects. 
  
 
Table A5   Growth effects of institutional quality, instability and trend – using the aggregate political risk index along with 
alternative institutional indicators and excluding outliers 
  Poor  Rich  Poor  Rich  Poor  Rich 
Alternative:  Herfindahl index  No outliers  No tails 
  Full baseline included 








































       




       




       
             
Observations  300  132  267  133  270  124 
Countries  100  38  92  39  94  39 
Between R square  .229  .019  .045  .374  .000  .325 
Within R square  .160  .445  .410  .653  .349  .628 
F statistic  2.99  5.49  11.48  15.80  8.89  12.65 
Hausmann test  81.20***  8.78  143.24***  22.13**  64.32***  24.86*** 
Notes. *** (**) [*] denote significance at p<.01 (p<.05) [p<.10]; all regressions are GLS with country and period fixed effects. 
  
 
Table A6   Growth effects of institutional quality, instability and trend – using the three PCA indices along with alternative 
institutional indicators 
  Poor  Rich  Poor  Rich  Poor  Rich 
Alternative:  Gastil index  Political Constraints V  Polity IV index 
  Full baseline included 
















































































































































             
Observations  311  136  308  131  308  122 
Countries  98  39  98  38  97  35 
Between R square  .000  .378  .000  .252  .000  .064 
Within R square  .403  .811  .397  .818  .434  .826 
F statistic  6.90  17.57  6.60  17.55  7.74  16.95 
Hausmann test  87.10***  58.42***  21.10  62.79***  5296.49***  45.65*** 
Notes. *** (**) [*] denote significance at p<.01 (p<.05) [p<.10]; all regressions are GLS with country and period fixed effects. 
  
 
Table A7. Growth effects of institutional quality, instability and trend – using the three PCA indices along with alternative 
institutional indicators and excluding outliers and tails 
  Poor  Rich  Poor  Rich  Poor  Rich 
Alternative:  Herfindahl index  No outliers  No tails 
  Full baseline included 
















































































































       




       




       
             
Observations  307  132  271  130  287  124 
Countries  100  38  94  38  96  40 
Between R square  .300  .018  .083  .367  .009  .397 
Within R square  .253  .572  .512  .807  .469  .819 
F statistic  3.56  5.63  10.57  19.80  9.67  19.49 
Hausmann test  68.28***  202.72***  32.72***  205.25***  53.51***  121.25*** 
Notes. *** (**) [*] denote significance at p<.01 (p<.05) [p<.10]; all regressions are GLS with country and period fixed effects.  
  
 
Table A8   Growth effects of institutional quality, including lagged growth 
     
  All  Poor  Rich  All  Poor  Rich 






     






     






     
















  .011 
(.373) 




























  .949*** 
(.242) 


















Observations  442  302  140  438  299  139 
Countries  130  98  40  128  97  40 
Between R square  .000  .004  .322  .004  .001  .306 
Within R square  .369  .369  .692  .383  .378  .805 
F statistic  15.97  10.30  18.14  10.68  6.62  19.96 
Hausmann test  85.59  112.88  15.88  233.52  20.58  370.65 




Table A9. Growth effects of institutional quality, IV estimates 
  Poor  Rich 
  RE  IV  IV  RE  IV  IV 








































































Legal quality trend      1.253 
(2.759) 
    7.869* 
(4.041) 
Policy quality trend      2.596 
(2.359) 
    1.442 
(4.070) 
Social tensions trend       1.027 
(3.322) 
     6.277* 
(3.316) 
             
Observations  282  282  282  138  138  138 
Countries  96  96  96  40  40  40 
Between R square  .359  .429  .448  .529  .615  .601 
Within R square  .182  .089  .115  .614  .538  .588 
Wald Chi Squared  93.84  90.78  103.19  152.75  116.66  145.93 
First Stage Chi 
Squared 












Notes. *** (**) [*] denote significance at p<.01 (p<.05) [p<.10]; all regressions are GLS with random effects and period fixed 
effects. Control variables are used throughout but are not reported for reasons of space. Instruments are lagged institutional quality 
and lagged growth. 
 
 